The Best Breakdown of America You’ve Never Heard - Richard Miniter

About TRIGGERnometry: Stand-up comedians Konstantin Kisin (@konstantinkisin) and Francis Foster (@francisjfoster) make sense of politics, economics, free speech, AI, drug policy and WW3 with the help of presidential advisors, renowned economists, award-winning journalists, controversial writers, leading scientists and notorious comedians. [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk) Introduction [04:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=272s) The English Civil War And The Puritans [13:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=825s) How Does This Impact America Today? [22:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1368s) The Balance Of Power In America [27:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1620s) The State Of The Four Utopias In America Today [33:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2016s) Why Is Christianity Surging Across The US? [41:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2509s) The Left's Fear Of The Religious Right [52:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3170s) The Non-Religious Right [01:04:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3860s) How The Differences Between The Two Groups On The Right Will Play Out [01:11:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4299s) The Republicans Captured The Left's Main Weapon [01:16:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4600s) What's The One Thing We're Not Talking About That We Should Be? --- America is presented as four enduring regional cultures—Puritan New England, Cavalier Tidewater/South, Midlands “middle states,” and Borderlands/Appalachia—each with its own idea of freedom and relationship to God and the state, whose interaction still structures U.S. politics today.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed) --- ## Detailed outline of the video ## Introduction and thesis (0:00–4:32) - Hosts introduce Richard Miniter, noting his background as a widely published journalist and author, and explain that this episode developed from an informal 2‑hour explanation he gave them about American history and culture.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Miniter states his core thesis: America was founded as four somewhat coercive religious utopias, each rooted in a different time and place in Britain’s past, and understanding the English Civil War is essential to understanding America.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## English Civil War and four source regions (4:32–13:45) - Miniter sketches the English Reformation and Civil War: post‑Henry VIII Protestant England, Puritan suspicion of the crown’s “Catholic leanings,” and conflict between Puritan “Roundheads” and royalist “Cavaliers.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He describes how social networks, not abstract “immigrants,” move: villagers bring their ideas of the village to America, reproducing English local cultures.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He then maps four English/British source cultures to four American regions, following David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed:[wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Puritans from East Anglia → New England (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Maine, parts of upstate New York). - Royalist southwest English (Cavaliers and dependents) → Virginia, Maryland tidewater, Carolinas, parts of Georgia and Kentucky. - West Midlands / Quaker “middle states” → Delaware Valley, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey. - North English/Scottish borderlands → the Appalachian backcountry from Maine to Georgia. ## Character of the four cultures (approx. 9:00–13:45) - New England Puritans are portrayed as legalistic and arrogant, with a history of witch trials that mirror East Anglian witch hunts; their idea of freedom is “freedom to impose virtue.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Cavalier tidewater culture supports hierarchy, big farms, and evolves from indentured servitude into African slavery; its idea of freedom is maintaining a social hierarchy.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Appalachian borderlanders (Hatfields and McCoys, “hillbillies”) value “the freedom to be left alone,” strongly oppose education (especially for women), and mix admirable independence with anti‑education traits.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - The Midlands/middle states want freedom to make money plus law and order to punish corruption, giving them a pragmatic commercial outlook.[[goodreads](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32081.Albion_s_Seed)][[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## How this shapes modern America (13:45–22:48) - Miniter argues that these four cultures yield four different ideas about the citizen–state and citizen–God relationship, so U.S. politics is a negotiation among them.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He uses the Civil War and regional sports mascots (e.g., Virginia “Cavaliers”) as examples of how Puritan–Cavalier conflict persists symbolically, with borderlands/Appalachians and Midlands in between.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Asked “Why is Trump popular?”, he explains that presidential victories come from mobilizing one’s own culture plus one or two others (e.g., Carter, Reagan, Clinton) and that Trump succeeded by assembling three of the four cultures against progressive Puritan‑style elites.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He notes Trump is weakest in New England and places settled from New England (California, Pacific Northwest), where Puritan cultural descendants cluster.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## Balance of power among the four “utopias” (22:48–27:00) - Miniter explains the balance of power shifts over time: Charleston was once among America’s richest cities; post‑WWII the Midlands industrial belt (PA, OH, MI, etc.) dominated; now Sunbelt/Cavalier‑type states like Florida and Texas are ascendant.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He argues deep‑red Cavalier‑tradition states are currently gaining population and cultural power (internal migration, tech moving to Austin/Miami), while New England’s cultural prestige has significantly faded despite elite universities.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - The Midlands/rust‑belt region, once deindustrializing, seems to have “hit bottom” and is climbing back, with politics shifting rightward and close elections hinging on a few swing states.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - Appalachia is described as having leveled off rather than rising; the current main struggle is between Cavaliers and Puritans, with the other two cultures as swing regions.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## Christianity’s resurgence and cultural loneliness (33:36–41:49) - Miniter attributes a recent surge in orthodox Christianity (Catholic Latin Mass, Orthodox churches, traditional Anglicanism, Orthodox Judaism) partly to COVID as a mortality shock for young people in an era of social loneliness.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He describes “dictatorship of the small screen,” Instagram‑driven nihilism, single‑parent homes, and the lack of clear male role models, leading many to seek traditional religious answers and embodied communities.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## The left’s fear of the religious right (41:49–52:50) - The hosts note left‑wing fear of the “religious right” and Miniter distinguishes two currents within it: a small theocratic minority wanting to use state power to impose religious norms, and a larger group seeking non‑coercive, self‑reliant Christian lives.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He emphasizes that politicizing Christianity risks corrupting it, and that most politically theocratic projects lack broad electoral support even in red states.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## The non‑religious right and the “accountable class” (52:50–1:04:20) - Miniter introduces an “accountable vs unaccountable” class distinction: accountable people’s income is directly tied to results (business owners, many workers), while the unaccountable (bureaucrats, some academics, long‑term welfare recipients) are insulated from performance.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He argues the accountable world is increasingly aligned with the right, while the unaccountable world tends to back left‑wing managerial politics that multiply layers of non‑accountable roles.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He describes the tech‑sector “non‑religious right” as initially pro‑Democrat but now alienated by bureaucratic inefficiency (e.g., fax‑based agencies) and attempts to cartelize tech, pushing them toward a reformist, results‑driven right.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He portrays Silicon Valley and figures like Musk as wanting to “digitize government” and expand the accountable class, while the unaccountable fear being forced into measurable productivity.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## How differences on the right may play out (1:04:20–1:11:39) - Miniter explains that the Republican Party is a **consensus** party, not a coalition party like the Democrats: factions fight until roughly 80% agree, then the rest mostly fall in line, making internal conflict a mechanism for shifting consensus rather than fragmentation.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He suggests that tensions between tech‑right and religious‑right are less structurally dangerous than left‑wing internal splits because of this consensus structure and the Republicans’ success at attracting new voters (e.g., Hispanics, parts of the Black and Asian vote).[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## Republicans capturing the left’s old main weapon (1:11:39–1:16:40) - Miniter argues Republicans have seized traditional left‑wing economic tools—worker protection, tariffs, immigration restriction—for the accountable class, leaving Democrats dominated by campus‑style, identity‑politics elites.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He criticizes the Democrats’ reliance on unaccountable coalition groups (public‑sector unions, ideological faculty, activist NGOs), saying they now prioritize internal coalition management over delivering results for voters.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] ## “What are we not talking about that we should be?” (1:16:40–end) - In response, Miniter highlights David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed as the foundational work on the four British folkways in America that underpins much of his framework, praising Fischer as a careful, center‑left historian.[wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] - He also mentions James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State as another key book on how state visions and schemes interact with society, suggesting it as a further lens on the themes he has raised.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)] --- ## Biography of Richard Miniter Richard Miniter (born 1967) is an American investigative journalist, best‑selling author, and media entrepreneur, currently CEO and chief content officer of Zenger News, a digital wire service. He previously worked as an editorial writer for The Wall Street Journal Europe and as an investigative reporter for The Sunday Times of London, co‑authoring a major series on the road to the 9/11 attacks that won an international investigative journalism award.[wikipedia+4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Miniter) Miniter has written several New York Times bestsellers, including Losing Bin Laden, Shadow War, Mastermind (a biography of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), and Leading From Behind, along with earlier business work The Myth of Market Share, which was used in business‑school curricula. A philosophy graduate of Vassar College, where he was a nationally ranked debater, he has reported internationally from conflict zones and on topics ranging from the Sudanese slave trade to African wildlife policy, and remains active as a commentator on national security, foreign policy, and American politics.[allamericanspeakers+3](https://www.allamericanspeakers.com/celebritytalentbios/Richard+Miniter/6309) --- ## Four cultures in brief New England / Puritan America descends from East Anglian Puritans who built tightly ordered, legalistic communities in New England, with a **freedom** ideal of “freedom to impose virtue” through communal moral regulation and strong institutions. Cavalier / Tidewater–Southern America comes from southwest English royalists who valued hierarchy, big farms, and eventually race slavery, defining freedom as maintaining a stable social order with clear ranks and gentry leadership.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=129)] Midlands / “Middle States” America grows from West Midlands and Quaker settlers in the Delaware Valley, whose core ideal is “freedom to make money” under honest law and order, producing a commercial, manufacturing, and pragmatic culture. Borderlands / Appalachian America stems from English–Scottish borderers who settled the backcountry, exalting “freedom to be left alone,” with fierce independence, clan loyalty, suspicion of outside authority, and a mixed record on education, especially for women.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=596)] ## The four “Americas” and their attributes ## Regional cultures derived from Albion’s Seed |“America” / Region|British source region & migration wave|Core religion/denomination tendency|Idea of **freedom** (Miniter’s phrasing)|Social traits Miniter emphasizes|Modern U.S. geography / examples| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |New England / Puritan America|Puritans from East Anglia (east of England) to Massachusetts and New England, 1629–1640[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed)|Reformed Protestant / Puritan, strong congregational churches|Freedom to impose virtue (community enforcing moral/legal order)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]|Legalistic, moralistic, historically witch‑hunting, highly literate, strong institutional/educational building.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][[goodreads](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32081.Albion_s_Seed)]|MA, CT, RI, NH, ME, parts of upstate NY; cultural echoes in CA, OR, WA.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]| |Cavalier / Tidewater & Deep South|Royalist elite and dependents from southwest England to Virginia, Maryland shore, Carolinas, etc., ca. 1649–1675[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed)|Anglican/established church, later various Southern Protestant traditions|Freedom to maintain hierarchy (ordered ranks, elites over dependents)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]|Plantation agriculture, gentry culture, evolution from indentured servitude into African slavery; mixed noble and “profoundly evil” elements.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]|Tidewater VA/MD, Carolinas, parts of GA, KY; today’s “Cavalier‑tradition” red states like much of the South.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]| |Midlands / “Middle States” America|Quakers and related Nonconformists from the West Midlands and Wales to the Delaware Valley, ca. 1675–1725[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed)|Quaker and other dissenting Protestant sects|Freedom to make money, with law and order to punish corruption[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]|Commercial, manufacturing focus, emphasis on honest markets, historically industrial “Rust Belt” powerhouses.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][[goodreads](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32081.Albion_s_Seed)]|PA, NJ, DE, NY; industrial Great Lakes belt (OH, IN, MI, IL) as later extension.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]| |Borderlands / Appalachian America|“Borderers” from northern England–southern Scotland and Ulster to backcountry Appalachia, ca. 1717–1775[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][goodreads+1](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32081.Albion_s_Seed)|Various low‑church Protestant / evangelical traditions|Freedom to be left alone (minimal interference by state or elites)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]|Fiercely independent, clan/feud traditions (Hatfields & McCoys), suspicious of education (esp. for women), culturally mixed bag.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)][[goodreads](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32081.Albion_s_Seed)]|Appalachian mountains and adjacent uplands from ME to GA, culturally informing modern interior red counties.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk)]| --- ## Modern patterns by culture |Culture / “America”|Presidential politics (esp. Trump vs Democrats)|COVID‑era responses|Religious trends & attitudes| |---|---|---|---| |New England / Puritan America|Weakest support for Trump; strong base for progressive Democrats and “hyper‑liberal progressivism,” especially in New England and places settled from it (CA, OR, WA).[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=994)]|More accepting of tight government controls: mask rules, business closures, activity bans seen as legitimate moral regulation.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=914)]|Historically rooted in Puritan moralism; today, more secular but still “freedom to impose virtue,” including PC/class‑coded language policing.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=583)]| |Cavalier / Tidewater–Southern|Key component of Trump’s coalition: “hierarchical idea of liberty” regions like the modern South (FL, TX, etc.) trending Republican; Democrats do better when they field Southerners.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=874)]|More resistant to COVID mandates that threaten status, work, or local autonomy, but less absolutist about “leave me alone” than Appalachia.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=914)]|Mix of traditional Protestant and resurgent Catholic/orthodox Christianity; JD Vance‑type figures blend hierarchy with renewed religious seriousness.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1873)]| |Midlands / “Middle States”|Historically swing: key Rust‑Belt states (PA, MI, WI, OH) now “turning more and more to the right,” with strong resonance for “Make America Great Again” industrial nostalgia.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1767)]|Pragmatic view: COVID restrictions judged through economic impact and corruption fears more than sheer liberty vs control; strong reaction to job‑killing rules.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1455)]|Less doctrinaire; religion and politics filtered through “freedom to make money plus law and order,” supporting churches that reinforce work and stability.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=626)]| |Borderlands / Appalachian|Core of Trump’s rise: “proto‑libertarian impulse” voters whose idea of freedom is to be left alone; COVID overreach pushed many firmly into his camp.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)]|COVID was a “watershed moment”: intense backlash to lockdowns, worship limits, and detailed rules (e.g., which aisles you could shop in).[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=914)]|Strong low‑church / evangelical strands; skepticism of outside authority, including both secular technocrats and Puritan‑style moral regulators.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)]| If you’d like, I can add a third table focusing just on “accountable vs unaccountable class” across these same four regions. --- Here’s a focused “accountable vs unaccountable class” table keyed to Miniter’s four cultures. --- ## Accountable vs unaccountable by region |Culture / Region|Typical accountable‑class roles (results‑tied work)|Typical unaccountable‑class roles (insulated from results)|Political tendency of each class (as Miniter describes)| |---|---|---|---| |New England / Puritan America|Private‑sector professionals and entrepreneurs who still live there but resent heavy regulation and taxes.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3318)]|University faculty, administrators, NGOs, media, and government staff in coastal blue metros with low direct performance ties.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3302)]|Accountable minority drifting rightward or toward reformist politics; unaccountable core forms the backbone of progressive Puritan‑style left.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3302)]| |Cavalier / Tidewater–Southern|Business owners, trades, energy, logistics, and military‑adjacent work in fast‑growing red states like TX, FL.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1630)]|State/local bureaucracies and parts of legacy industries that still operate on old patronage or non‑performance bases.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3220)]|Growing accountable class strongly aligned with the populist/right; unaccountable pockets tend to remain Democratic but are shrinking in relative influence.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1669)]| |Midlands / “Middle States”|Factory, logistics, small‑business, and trades workers whose jobs live or die on output and customer demand.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1761)]|Public‑sector unions, some municipal bureaucracies, and dependent welfare structures in older industrial cities.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3302)]|Accountable class shifting markedly toward the right/MAGA as deindustrialization and regulation bite; unaccountable class remains a key Democratic base in old blue cities.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1767)]| |Borderlands / Appalachian|Self‑employed trades, extraction industries, trucking, and service jobs where “if you don’t show up, you don’t get paid.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)]|Smaller public‑sector and transfer‑dependent strata (disability, long‑term benefits) but less dense bureaucratic infrastructure overall.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3279)]|Accountable culture is intensely anti‑mandate and strongly pro‑Trump/right; unaccountable elements lean left for benefits but are numerically weaker than in coastal metros.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=903)]| Do you want one more table that maps these four cultures to specific _professions_ or subcultures (e.g., tech, academia, military, media) for your notes? --- Here’s a professions/subcultures table aligned with the four cultures as Miniter describes them. --- ## Professions and subcultures by culture |Culture / Region|Dominant professions & sectors today (tendential, not exclusive)|Academia & intellectual life|Tech & innovation|Military, law, & security|Media & cultural production| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |New England / Puritan|Elite professionals (law, consulting, finance), public‑sector managers, NGO staff, blue‑state civil‑service roles.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1684)]|High concentration of elite universities and think tanks; campus culture heavily shapes national progressive ideas.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1684)]|Older coastal tech and biotech clusters; more regulated, prestige‑oriented, intertwined with universities.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1712)]|Legal and regulatory elites, federal agencies, and blue‑state urban police/judicial bureaucracies.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3210)]|Legacy national media, publishing, and “PC/class‑coded language” arbiters centered in coastal metros.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2362)]| |Cavalier / Tidewater–South|Business owners, real estate, construction, logistics, energy, agriculture, plus growing Sunbelt white‑collar sectors.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1630)]|Fewer globally dominant universities, but growing regional schools aligned with business and professional training.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1721)]|Major new tech hubs (Austin, Miami) blending Cavalier hierarchy with immigrant entrepreneurial energy.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1630)]|Strong representation in the military officer and enlisted corps and in Republican‑leaning law enforcement.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1669)]|Conservative talk‑media, megachurch media ecosystems, and Sunbelt‑based content aimed at aspirational middle classes.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1873)]| |Midlands / “Middle States”|Manufacturing, logistics, trades, small manufacturing firms, and resurgent local entrepreneurship in Rust‑Belt towns.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1441)]|Regional state universities and community colleges focused on practical degrees; historically union‑influenced thought.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1455)]|Industrial and applied‑tech firms (auto, machinery, logistics tech) rather than consumer‑facing Silicon Valley style.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1794)]|Police, fire, corrections, and National Guard roles; strong identification with “law and order” and stable careers.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=626)]|Local TV/radio, sports‑driven culture, and nostalgic narratives about mid‑century prosperity (“Make America Great Again”).[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1834)]| |Borderlands / Appalachian|Self‑employed trades, trucking, extraction (coal, oil/gas), small shops; work where “if you don’t show up, you don’t get paid.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)]|Lower density of large campuses; skepticism of formal higher ed, especially for women, persists culturally.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=596)]|Less large‑scale tech; pockets of remote work and small software shops existing alongside traditional industries.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1852)]|High military enlistment rates, gun culture, and local sheriff/constable authority reflecting “freedom to be left alone.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)]|Country music, evangelical Christian media, and “hillbilly” / backcountry subcultures shaping national political imagery.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=572)]| --- ``` What are the main freedoms that these groups brought to America? Which group brought them? How do these freedoms map onto the Constitution of the United States by article? ``` Each culture brings a different “main freedom”: Puritans (New England) emphasize **freedom** to impose and live under a shared moral order; Cavaliers (Tidewater/South) stress freedom to maintain hierarchy and property; Borderlanders (Appalachia) insist on freedom to be left alone; Midlands/middle states seek freedom to make money under honest law and order. These map imperfectly—but suggestively—onto different emphases in the U.S. constitutional structure, with Puritan and Midlands instincts reflected more in the institutional Articles, and Borderland–Cavalier instincts more in rights‑limiting state power (largely via the Bill of Rights and later amendments).[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=587)] --- ## Main freedoms and which group brought them - New England / Puritan America - Main freedom: “Freedom to impose virtue”—that is, to build a godly commonwealth with tight community standards and law enforcing shared moral norms.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=583)] - Brought by: Puritans from East Anglia who settled Massachusetts and the wider New England region.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=129)] - Cavalier / Tidewater–Southern America - Main freedom: “Freedom to maintain a social hierarchy”—freedom for an elite to rule, own large estates, and preserve a stratified order, including through slavery.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=169)] - Brought by: Royalist Cavaliers and dependents from southwest England who settled Virginia, Maryland tidewater, the Carolinas, etc.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=146)] - Borderlands / Appalachian America - Main freedom: “Freedom to be left alone”—minimal interference from church, gentry, or state in local life and family choices.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=590)] - Brought by: English–Scottish borderlanders settling the Appalachian backcountry on both sides of the mountains.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=254)] - Midlands / “Middle States” America - Main freedom: “Freedom to make money, with law and order to punish corruption”—commercial liberty within a framework that enforces honest dealing.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=616)] - Brought by: Quakers and related groups from the West Midlands and Wales into the Delaware Valley and surrounding states.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=223)] --- ## How these freedoms map onto the Constitution (by article) This mapping is interpretive: Miniter does not walk article‑by‑article, but his cultural framework lines up plausibly with different constitutional emphases.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=767)] ## Article I – Legislature - Puritan influence: The idea of a written, detailed legal code expressing communal moral judgment echoes Puritan legislatures and town‑meeting governance that tried to encode virtue.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=704)] - Midlands influence: Article I’s focus on taxation, commerce, and bankruptcy law reflects the Midlands’ “freedom to make money” under predictable rules.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=626)] ## Article II – Executive - Cavalier influence: A single, symbolically elevated executive (President) resonates with Cavalier comfort with hierarchy and strong leadership figures, even in a republican form.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=165)] - Borderland influence: Strong suspicion of monarchical power is why the executive is checked and term‑limited; that restraint tracks the “leave me alone” instinct pressing back on hierarchical freedom.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=691)] ## Article III – Judiciary - Puritan & Midlands influence: A law‑driven, court‑centered system enforcing contracts and public morality fits both Puritan legalism and Midlands’ concern with honest markets and punishing corruption.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=206)] - Cavalier influence: Protection of property rights via courts also preserves aspects of hierarchical order and estate ownership prized in Cavalier regions.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=169)] ## Article IV – States, citizens, new states - Borderland influence: Strong state sovereignty, plus a federal structure that allows varied local regimes, lets “freedom to be left alone” regions keep more autonomy over internal affairs.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=810)] - All four cultures: Full faith and credit, privileges and immunities, and the admission of new states structure the ongoing negotiation among the four “utopias” across a continent.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=767)] ## Article V – Amendments - Puritan & Midlands influence: A legalistic, process‑heavy path to change—difficult but possible—mirrors Puritan faith in covenantal law and Midlands’ preference for orderly reform rather than revolt.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)] - Borderland & Cavalier influence: High supermajority thresholds protect local orders from rapid national moral or economic projects imposed from above.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=767)] ## Article VI – Supremacy, oaths, debts - Puritan influence: Oath‑taking and national supremacy over conflicting state laws reflect a desire to bind all under a higher covenant, secularizing the Puritan idea of a godly commonwealth.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=767)] - Midlands influence: Honoring debts and stable federal supremacy over treaties and obligations align with commercial reliability.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=626)] ## Article VII – Ratification - All cultures: Ratification by separate state conventions embodies a compromise among regional cultures rather than simple top‑down imposition—each “utopia” consents through its own social networks.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=737)] --- ## Bill of Rights: clearer matches to the four freedoms While you asked “by article,” the cultural freedoms correlate most sharply with the first ten amendments, which limit national power in ways each culture pushed for. - Puritan America - 1st Amendment (free exercise, speech, press, assembly): initially, many Puritans did _not_ want broad religious liberty, but their intense concern about right worship and conscience helped make religious questions central; over time, their scriptural literacy and disputatiousness feed into robust protected debate.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=320)] - 10th Amendment (reserved powers): local moral regulation (blue laws, schooling norms) reflects the Puritan desire to shape virtue at the town/state level rather than have a distant center dictate it.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=704)] - Cavalier America - 2nd, 3rd, and property‑related understandings (takings, due process): an armed gentry and local militia, and strong property protections, preserve a hierarchical order where elite landholders remain secure.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=587)] - 10th Amendment: state police powers in slave and post‑slave South entrench regional hierarchy within a federal shell. - Borderlands / Appalachian America - 2nd Amendment: personal arms and militias accord directly with “freedom to be left alone” and self‑defense against both criminals and overbearing authority.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=903)] - 4th–5th Amendments (searches, warrants, self‑incrimination): protections against intrusion into home and life track borderer hostility to outsiders and distant officials.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=580)] - Midlands / Middle States America - 5th–7th Amendments (due process, takings, jury trials in civil cases): these safeguard contracts, property, and fair procedures vital to commercial freedom and anti‑corruption concerns.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1455)] - Commerce‑related readings of the 1st Amendment (press, petition) and federal structure support business advocacy and predictable economic rules. --- ``` Who else has talked about the idea that immigration is not from country to country, but by social networks from city to city, where each group brings their ideas into each city? ``` Several major scholars and research traditions have made versions of this “migration by social networks/city‑to‑city” argument, even if they phrase it differently. --- ## Network‑driven migration in the research literature - Douglas Massey and colleagues in the “new economics of labor migration” have long argued that migration is strongly channeled by interpersonal and kin networks, showing empirically that people move where they already have family and friends, which creates self‑reinforcing flows into particular U.S. states and cities rather than a random spread across a country.[faculty.washington+2](https://faculty.washington.edu/matsueda/courses/590/Readings/Palloni%20and%20Massey%202001%20AJS.pdf) - Work on migrant social networks as social capital similarly emphasizes that once someone from a village or town migrates, their ties become a resource that lowers costs and risks for others, producing chain migration along specific community‑to‑city routes (e.g., a certain Mexican town to Chicago) rather than undifferentiated “Mexico to the United States.”[ipc2005.popconf+1](https://ipc2005.popconf.org/papers/52039) - Recent quantitative network studies (e.g., “Migration and the Value of Social Networks”) confirm that individuals are more likely to migrate to destinations where their personal networks are denser and more interconnected, reinforcing the idea that it is network structure—not just country‑level conditions—that drives where migrants actually land.[g2lm-lic.iza+1](https://g2lm-lic.iza.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/G2lmlic-wp060.pdf) - Policy‑oriented syntheses (e.g., Migration Policy Institute work by Maritsa Poros) explicitly describe “migrant social networks” as vehicles that connect specific origin communities with specific destination cities and sectors, channeling newcomers into those same places and occupations over time.[migrationpolicy+1](https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migrant-social-networks-vehicles-migration-integration-and-development) --- ## City‑to‑city and global‑city perspectives - Saskia Sassen’s “global cities” and “global cities and diasporic networks” work argues that under globalization, networks of major cities (New York, London, Tokyo, etc.) become key nodes for flows of people as well as capital, such that migrants often move into a transnational urban system rather than simply “to a country.”[robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb+2](https://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/Saskia%20Sassen.pdf) - Demographic studies of “new destinations” in the U.S. show that as classic gateways saturate, networks extend to secondary cities (e.g., from Los Angeles or New York to specific Southern or Midwestern metros), again via social ties and occupational referrals, not random dispersal.[paa2006.populationassociation+1](https://paa2006.populationassociation.org/papers/61504) --- ``` What does Thomas Sowell say about this idea of specific immigration from city to city? Please cite his quotes. ``` Thomas Sowell explicitly makes the “not country‑to‑country but highly specific, networked flows” point in his migration work, though he doesn’t usually phrase it in exactly those words; he talks about migration as selective streams from particular villages, regions, and social strata into particular cities and neighborhoods, guided by localized information and help networks.[[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)][[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] --- ## Sowell’s core idea on city‑ and network‑based migration Sowell stresses that migration is selective and structured, not random, both in origins and destinations: - “Migrations tend to be **selective**, rather than random, in terms of skills and ambition, as well as in **origins and destinations**. The immigrant population from a given country living in another country is often highly **atypical** of the population in the country from which they came, in terms of their **geographical and social origins**.”[[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)] - “Behind such migration patterns often lay particular beginnings of a new community in a new land when one **pioneering individual, family, or group of families** decided to try their luck overseas. Once established, immigrants from a **particular village, city, or region** became sources of **highly localized information** about the new country and, in the case of family members especially, often provided **tangible help in moving and resettlement**.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)][[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)] Those two sentences are about as close as you can get to Miniter’s “there’s no such thing as immigration from country A to country B; social networks move” line, in Sowell’s own language.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=732)][[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)] He also emphasizes spatial clustering at the city and neighborhood level: - “Immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe and their descendants **remained geographically distributed** in the United States in very different regional patterns from that of the American population as a whole… Asian‑Americans were likewise distributed among the regions of the country in their own distinctive patterns.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] - “In these and other cases, it is not that a particular group could exclude immigrants from other countries or exclude citizens of the country in which they settled. **Rather, they simply clustered together where they could.**”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] And he generalizes the cultural‑carryover point very explicitly: - “If there is one pattern that emerges from all these histories it is that **each group has its own cultural pattern—and that these patterns do not disappear upon crossing a border or an ocean.** Nor are these patterns always coextensive with national or racial groups.”[reason+1](https://reason.com/1996/05/01/migration-patterns/) --- ## How close this is to “city‑to‑city” language Sowell usually writes in terms of: - “particular village, city, or region” feeding a specific community abroad.[[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)][[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] - distinctive “regional patterns” and “particular streets” or neighborhoods concentrated by origin.[techratchet+1](https://techratchet.com/2021/05/28/book-summary-ethnic-america-a-history-by-thomas-sowell/)[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] So he is clearly describing **networked flows between specific localities** (e.g., a given Irish county into a few Northeastern cities, particular Indian regions into specific streets in Bombay, particular Greek families into Sydney and Melbourne), but he frames it as: - localized information + help → repeated flows from that locality to that destination. That’s conceptually the same mechanism Miniter is pointing at in the clip when he says “all immigration is the movement of social networks and ideas move in social networks.” Sowell’s quotes above are your best textual anchors if you want to connect his work to that city‑to‑city, network‑driven migration idea.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=732)] --- Got it—that makes sense as a project. Thomas Sowell is a very good fit for that list, because in both _Ethnic America_ and _Migrations and Cultures_ he frames immigration as selective, networked flows from particular villages/regions into specific communities abroad, guided by “pioneering” families and very localized information and assistance. He stresses that these streams are atypical slices of the home population with distinctive geographical and social origins, and that once a beachhead exists in a given city or neighborhood, later movement from that origin follows those same social ties.[[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)][[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)] For your roster of authors who treat immigration as social‑network / locality‑to‑locality rather than abstract country‑to‑country, solid names to tag are: - Thomas Sowell – _Ethnic America_; _Migrations and Cultures_.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr1CNTo8TFM)][[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/)] - Douglas Massey et al. – social capital and international migration; chain migration via family networks.[faculty.washington+1](https://faculty.washington.edu/matsueda/courses/590/Readings/Palloni%20and%20Massey%202001%20AJS.pdf) - Saskia Sassen – “global cities” and diasporic networks linking specific origin communities to specific global cities.[robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb+2](https://robinson.faculty.soc.ucsb.edu/Assets/pdf/Saskia%20Sassen.pdf) - David Hackett Fischer – _Albion’s Seed_ on British regional folkways reproducing themselves in particular American regions.[wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed) --- Here are some clean, citable snippets you can drop into your note set for each of the three. --- ## Douglas Massey – migrant networks & specific sending communities A concise statement of the network mechanism (on Mexico–U.S. migration): - “Migrant networks are **webs of social ties** that link potential migrants in **sending communities** to people in **receiving societies**, and **their existence lowers the costs of international movement**. With each person that becomes a migrant, the cost of migration is reduced for a set of friends and relatives, inducing them to migrate and **further expanding the network**.”[[pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17751562/)] On how a few pioneers from a locality create a cascading, community‑specific flow: - “Social connections between previous and aspiring migrants allow more people to make the move than would have been the case otherwise, and eventually **the whole of the community of origin comes to be involved in migration**. The initial migration **sets in motion a cascading process of additional migration**. Massey and colleagues called this **cumulative causation**.”[[uir.unisa.ac](https://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/21518/Momiden.pdf?isAllowed=y&sequence=1)] On how ties to _someone_ already abroad sharply change individual odds: - “Studies… have clearly established that **having a social tie to a United States migrant dramatically increases the odds of emigration** … and that the size of [this] effect varies with the **strength of the tie and the closeness of the relationship**.”[un+1](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/unpd-egm_2005_11-12_p04_massey_aysa.pdf) These give you: (1) explicit “webs of ties” language; (2) community‑level cascade; (3) quantified tie‑effect language. --- ## Saskia Sassen – global cities and diasporic networks On cities as nodal platforms that partly bypass states: - “The growing **intensity of transactions among major cities** is creating a **strategic cross-border geography that partly bypasses national states**.”[saskiasassen+1](https://www.saskiasassen.com/PDFs/publications/Global-Cities-and-Diasporic-Networks.pdf) On cities as convergence points for transnational people‑flows: - “The **city**… is emerging as a **key site for the most astounding mix of people from all over the world**.”[saskiasassen+1](https://saskiasassen.com/PDFs/publications/Global-Cities-and-Diasporic-Networks.pdf) On how what we call “local” actually sits in trans‑city networks: - “Under these conditions, much of what we experience and represent as the **local level turns out to be a micro‑environment with global span**.”[[transnationalism.uchicago](https://transnationalism.uchicago.edu/LocalActorsinGlobalPolitics.pdf)] And on cities as infrastructure for cross‑border networks (you can use this to link to your city‑to‑city idea): - “Global cities and the **new strategic geographies that connect them and bypass national states** can be seen as constituting part of the **infrastructure for global civil society**.”[[transnationalism.uchicago](https://transnationalism.uchicago.edu/Diasporic%20Network.pdf)] These give you: (1) explicit “cities, not states” wording; (2) cities as people‑mixing nodes; (3) local‑as‑global‑network idea. --- ## David Hackett Fischer – _Albion’s Seed_ and specific origin→region streams On the four very specific folk migrations: - “From 1629 to 1775, the present‑day United States was settled by at least **four major waves of English‑speaking immigrants, each originating from a specific region of Britain and carrying a unique set of folkways**.”[[sobrief](https://sobrief.com/books/albions-seed)] On how like‑minded groups cluster and transplant their ways together: - “British America’s **voluntary migration encouraged religious diversity** rather than uniformity. It also **allowed like‑minded colonists of various sects to settle together and to transplant their own folkways to the New World**.”[[techratchet](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/23/book-summary-albions-seed-four-british-folkways-in-america-by-david-hackett-fisher/)] On entire neighborhoods moving as a social unit: - “Whole **neighborhoods formed parties for removal; so that departure from their native country is no longer exile**.”[[sobrief](https://sobrief.com/books/albions-seed)] On westward diffusion preserving distinct cultural “bands”: - “After the initial settlements, **each of the four cultures expanded geographically, carrying their folkways into new territories**. New Englanders moved west and north, Virginians south and west, Quakers west through the midlands, and borderers south and west along the Appalachian chain and beyond. **These migrations created broad cultural regions across the continent**.”[[sobrief](https://sobrief.com/books/albions-seed)] Those lines give you: (1) “specific region” sourcing; (2) like‑minded clustering; (3) neighborhood‑as‑unit migration; (4) persistent culture bands. --- ``` How does Miniter outline the African-American culture of the United States? What other authors talk about this idea of multiple cultures as opposed to the idea of "race" creating difference? ``` Miniter says African‑American life in the U.S. is better understood as multiple **cultures** that intersect with his four Anglo folkways, not as a single “race” block; he distinguishes at least three African‑American cultures (Southern hierarchical, Northern/Midwestern, and recent African/Caribbean immigrants), and explicitly warns that when he says “culture” he does not mean what the left means by “race.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1280)] --- ## Miniter on African‑American cultures - He insists his framework is cultural, not racial: “When I’m talking about culture, I don’t mean what people on the left mean, which is race. There’s no racial component here… functionally, you have three African‑American cultures.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1261)] - He then sketches: - “the African‑American culture of the south which is very much in line with this hierarchical idea of liberty” (i.e., Cavalier‑style order), - “the African‑American culture of the north and of the Midwest which is a different kind,” and - “the third which is recent immigration from West Africa… or people from the Caribbean,” who “voted much more for Trump than other black Americans.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1303)] So for your notes: he treats black Americans as internally diverse cultures mapped onto his regional schema and overlaid by newer diasporic streams, not as a monolithic “race” with one political or cultural profile.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4032)] --- ## Other authors who emphasize cultures over “race” Here are some good names and angles to connect to this “multiple cultures, not race as destiny” idea: - **Thomas Sowell** – In _Ethnic America_ and _Migrations and Cultures_ he repeatedly shows how different immigrant and black groups follow distinct cultural patterns (e.g., Southern blacks vs Northern blacks vs West Indian blacks), stressing that cultural habits, skills, and networks—not race—explain most group differences in income, education, and urban patterns.[techratchet+2](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/) - **David Hackett Fischer** – _Albion’s Seed_ is Miniter’s explicit foundation; Fischer argues that four British regional folkways created enduring cultural regions in America, and he treats later groups (including African‑Americans) in terms of how they slot into or reshape those regional folk cultures rather than as simple “races.”[wikipedia+1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion's_Seed) - **Orlando Patterson** – In work on slavery and its aftermath, Patterson frames black American life around cultural “freedom” traditions and social structures shaped by slavery and post‑slavery institutions, cutting across simple racial explanations.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Rogers Brubaker** – In _Ethnicity Without Groups_ and related essays, he pushes away from reified “races” and toward situational, historically rooted **cultural** and political groupings, which fits your interest in multiple black (and white) cultures instead of fixed racial blocks.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] --- ``` What about the topic of "structural racism" -- what other authors dismantle this idea in favor of understanding actual cultural differences rather than bigotry and racism? What is the direction of the trend of bigotry and racism? ``` Miniter’s view is that much of what younger people now label “structural racism” is better explained by older regional cultures and class structures, with **bigotry** in the U.S. now far lower than in the segregation era. He illustrates the cultural shift with his “Star Wars question,” arguing that the bar’s “we don’t serve their kind” line—obvious to 1977 audiences as a reference to Southern segregation—no longer carries that meaning for many younger viewers, which he takes as evidence that overt racism has receded.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1581)] --- ## Miniter on “structural racism” and bigotry’s trend - When younger people attribute contemporary problems to “structural racism,” Miniter pushes back with the cantina scene from the original _Star Wars_: in 1977, audiences instantly recognized “we don’t serve their kind” as an allusion to bars that excluded black customers; his point is that this code has largely faded from today’s cultural memory.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1550)] - He explicitly says he does not believe racism has vanished—“there’s a terrible part in every human heart that dislikes those who are not like them”—but argues that **bigotry has dropped to its lowest ebb in American history**, using the loss of that shared 1970s segregation context as a heuristic.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1612)] In other words: he doesn’t deny prejudice exists; he denies that present conditions are well‑described as an ongoing 1960s‑style racial order, and he prefers cultural, regional, and class explanations over “structural racism” as a master concept.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4587)] --- ## Authors who critique “structural racism” in favor of culture Here are some key authors you can tag as pushing in a similar direction—critically reassessing “structural racism” and putting more weight on culture, institutions, and incentives: - **Thomas Sowell** – Across _Ethnic America_, _Migrations and Cultures_, and later essays, Sowell repeatedly argues that outcome differences between groups (including black vs white) stem largely from cultural capital, skills, family structure, and geographic/historical patterns, rather than ongoing white hostility or “systemic” racism as a sufficient explanation.[techratchet+2](https://techratchet.com/2020/04/24/book-summary-migration-and-culture-by-thomas-sowell/) - **Orlando Patterson** – While he recognizes racism’s historical reality, Patterson emphasizes the cultural and institutional legacies of slavery (e.g., patterns of “social death,” family formation, and conceptions of freedom) as the main structures shaping black life, which cuts against a purely present‑tense “structural racism” framing and shifts focus to cultural repair.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Glenn Loury** – Loury critiques “structural racism” as too blunt and self‑sealing a concept, arguing that persistent disparities are better analyzed through incentives, social capital, and specific policy histories than through an all‑purpose accusation of invisible racism.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Rogers Brubaker** – In _Ethnicity Without Groups_, Brubaker questions reified racial/ethnic categories, pressing for analysis of concrete practices and institutions rather than treating “race” as a unitary, quasi‑magical cause; this aligns with your interest in multiple cultures and class positions rather than race per se.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] Taken together, these writers don’t deny that racism exists, but they all push away from “structural racism” as the primary explanatory variable and toward detailed cultural, institutional, and incentive‑based accounts of group differences—very close to Miniter’s instincts in this conversation.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=1261)][investors+1](https://www.investors.com/politics/columnists/thomas-sowell-abstract-immigrants-in-an-abstract-world/) For your next pass through the video, would you rather dig into authors who parallel his accountable vs unaccountable class idea, or those who parallel his “four founding cultures” frame in other countries (e.g., Canada, South Africa)? --- Censorship in practice is closely tied to protecting a ruling class and managing class conflict rather than protecting the public; many of the sharpest quotes frame it as a tool elites use to keep criticism and “class against class” politics under control.[wikiquote+2](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Censorship) --- ## Censorship as class control - George Orwell, on informal, elite‑driven censorship rather than overt bans: “**The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without any official ban.**”[[orwellfoundation](https://www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/the-freedom-of-the-press/)] - U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, on what censorship reveals about those in charge: “**Censorship reflects a society’s lack of confidence in itself. It is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime.**”[danlmillereducationauthor+1](https://danlmillereducationauthor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Censorship-Best-Quotes-on.pdf) - Glenn Greenwald, on corporate platforms siding with power: “**YouTube caved in defense of the powerful. That’s what they will always do. Defend the mob and the powerful at the expense of those who are marginalized.**”[[rt](https://www.rt.com/usa/461342-tucker-carlson-youtube-censorship-greenwald/)] - Greenwald again, on liberals misreading who censorship really protects: “**Liberals… convince themselves that Silicon Valley giants… are exercising censorship powers in defense of marginalized people against the powerful.**”[[rt](https://www.rt.com/usa/461342-tucker-carlson-youtube-censorship-greenwald/)] - An older observation linking censorship with class peace: “**We wish to silence the cry of class against class, and stifle the party appeal to class, so that we may ensure tranquility in our own freedom.**”[[en.wikiquote](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Censorship)] --- ## Censorship, manufactured consent, and “safe” speech - Orwell on language‑policing as deeper than simple book‑banning: by narrowing acceptable vocabulary, “**powerful institutions narrow the range of acceptable thought**,” making dissent “literally unthinkable.”[[edlatimore](https://edlatimore.com/1984-quotes-and-ideas/)] - From U.S. First Amendment doctrine (Justice Douglas–style critique), on “offensiveness” standards: “**Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community’s standards is too loose… Juries can censor… what they don’t like… This is community censorship in one of its worst forms.**”[[en.wikiquote](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Censorship)] - Greenwald on journalists as an “unaccountable” professional‑managerial class fortifying a caste system: corporate journalists “**destroy the lives** of powerless people” while “**never meaningfully challenging anyone in real power**,” helping to **fortify the ‘caste system’** that places them within elite circles.[[foxnews](https://www.foxnews.com/media/greenwald-washington-post-times-elites-victims-media)] If you tell me which direction you want to push this—more Orwell/fictional, more legal (Supreme Court), or more contemporary (Greenwald/tech platforms)—I can assemble a tight Obsidian‑ready block organized just around that slice. Miniter explicitly links censorship to class warfare by describing “political correctness” as a status move by an educated elite against everyone else. He frames it as the “censorship wing” of the Democratic Party failing to see that ordinary people now recognize this dynamic and resent it.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2340)] --- ## Key Miniter quotes on censorship and class - On why elites like censorship: “I think that the society in Europe is starting to realize they’re not making—they’re kind of toxic people and they’re not making the best decisions for all of us. They’re making the best decisions for **themselves**. And I think that’s the problem the Democratic Party has in the United States. I think ordinary people could say, ‘Well, okay, **we understand why you like censorship. It makes it easier for you. You think you’re better than us**…’.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2329)] - On political correctness as class warfare: “…what the **censorship wing** of the Democratic Party… hasn’t realized [is] that the average person has realized that **political correctness is really a form of class warfare**. When you’re correcting people’s words and phrases, what you’re really saying is, ‘I went to university. I learned the magic words. You didn’t. And I’m going to correct you and I’m going to improve you and I’m going to scold you because **I am better than you**. **It’s class warfare.**’”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2376)] - On how widespread this realization now is: “It took a while for people to work that out. **But I think on both sides of the Atlantic, they have. And they resent it.**”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2379)] - On the deeper danger when elites won’t recognize equal dignity across classes: “The inability to recognize the **humanity of people with different education levels and different income levels**… is profoundly destabilizing. And this is a problem caused by our elite. If you cannot see people with fewer years of education and fewer dollars in their pocket as equal to you… you are on the **road to anarchy or civil war**.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2392)] These passages are the core of his argument that contemporary censorship and language‑policing function as a form of class dominance, not primarily as protection of vulnerable groups.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=2376)] Are you planning to drop these into a broader Obsidian note on “accountable vs unaccountable class,” or do you want parallel quotes from someone like Greenwald or Sowell to pair with Miniter on this point? --- ``` Okay, let's focus on the Accountable versus Unaccountable world. What are the key quotes from Miniter about this? Then, tell me what other writers are discussing these ideas and their implications? ``` Miniter’s “accountable vs unaccountable” distinction is about whether your pay is tied to real‑world results, and he argues these two worlds are “at war” with each other, with the unaccountable world clustered around the modern left and the accountable world increasingly rebelling.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3241)] --- ## Key Miniter quotes on the accountable vs unaccountable world - Defining the split: “There’s an **accountable** and an **unaccountable** world and they’re at war with each other. When I say accountable, I’m not talking about an income level. I mean, **is your pay tied to some specific result**… Is there a real‑world result that you are paid on the basis of, **or are you paid simply for showing up**?”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3262)] - Who is in each world: “In the accountable world these are the people who are **doing most of the working and paying most of the taxes**. In the unaccountable world you have the **unemployed, retirees and pensioners, people on various social support programs, students, graduate students**…”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3284)] - Political alignment and the “managerial revolution”: “[T]he unaccountable world **largely votes left** and the left‑wing managerial revolution has been to **insert layers to insulate people from accountability**. And now the accountable class… have been just bedeviled by regulations and taxes and cultural hatred and so on and **they’re sick of it**.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3318)] - Tech vs bureaucracy and expanding the accountable class: Silicon Valley looks at U.S. government and says: “**We have to expand the accountability class and shrink the unaccountable class. Second of all there’s tremendous opportunity to digitize government.**”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3401)] He notes Musk has to fax forms to the FAA, and agencies still mail paper between departments, which he uses as an emblem of entrenched unaccountable bureaucracy.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3335)] - Fear of accountability: “The **very fear of the unaccountable class is accountability**… Tell me five things you did last week. Why is that terrifying? Because if you’ve lived this unaccountable existence… suddenly you’re going to have to live an **accountable life. That’s terrifying.** … The unaccountable live in fear of accountability.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3608)] - Macro‑diagnosis (U.S. vs Europe): “The growth of innovation in America has been this **accountability**… and the slow death of Europe has been that **the unaccountable class has become dominant**… It’s really about **how much of your life do you want dictated by a class of people who are not accountable to you or even to themselves** and how much money do you want to give them too?”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3836)] These are the backbone lines for his accountable/unaccountable schema. --- ## Other writers working with similar ideas (and implications) Several people are circling very similar terrain, even if they use different labels. ## 1. Managerial class vs productive class - **James Burnham – “managerial revolution”** Burnham’s _The Managerial Revolution_ (1941) argued that a new class of managers and bureaucrats, neither owners nor workers, had taken control of modern states and corporations. This maps well onto Miniter’s “unaccountable” world: salaried managers whose careers are insulated from direct market feedback and who accumulate power through layers of administration.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3210)][[migrationinstitute](https://www.migrationinstitute.org/files/news/hein-de-haas-v3-the-internal-dynamics-of-migration-processes.pdf)] - **Christopher Lasch – professional–managerial elite** Lasch, especially in _The Revolt of the Elites_, describes a mobile, educated professional elite whose loyalties are “upward” and global rather than to local communities. That echoes Miniter’s portrait of campus‑driven, credentialed classes who design policy for others while being shielded from its consequences.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4360)][[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] ## 2. “Somebody vs anybody” and skin‑in‑the‑game - **Nassim Nicholas Taleb – skin in the game** Taleb differentiates between people who bear consequences (have “skin in the game”) and those who don’t; he is scathing about bureaucrats and intellectuals who pay no price for being wrong. That’s nearly identical to Miniter asking whether you’re paid for results or “paid simply for showing up,” and to his claim that the unaccountable class fears being asked, “Tell me five things you did last week.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4360)] - **Thomas Sowell – “people who pay no price for being wrong”** Sowell’s famous line—“It is hard to imagine a more stupid or more dangerous way of making decisions than by putting those decisions in the hands of people who **pay no price for being wrong**”—is a crisp summary of Miniter’s gripe with the unaccountable world running government, campuses, and NGOs.[[reason](https://reason.com/1996/05/01/migration-patterns/)][[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3210)] ## 3. New class / Brahmin vs populist - **Michael Lind – managerial overclass vs working class** Lind’s recent work (_The New Class War_, etc.) describes an “overclass” of college‑educated managers and professionals versus a working‑class majority, with conflicts over who governs institutions. That matches Miniter’s observation that the unaccountable world (often credentialed, campus‑oriented) “largely votes left,” while many Hispanics, Asians, and others in the accountable world are drifting right as they feel over‑regulated and culturally disdained.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3293)][[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **David Goodhart – “Anywheres vs Somewheres”** Goodhart frames politics as a clash between rootless, high‑education “Anywheres” and more locally rooted “Somewheres.” That dovetails with Miniter’s emphasis that accountable people (small business, trades, service workers) are tied to concrete results in specific places, while unaccountable layers inhabit universities, public administrations, and NGOs with weak feedback from ordinary citizens.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3302)][[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] --- ``` What are his key quotes about a coalition party versus a consensus party? who else is writing about this idea? ``` Miniter’s key point is that the Democratic Party is a fragile **coalition** party that must constantly manage disparate groups, while the Republican Party is a **consensus** party that fights internally until a shared line emerges and then largely unites.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3915)] --- ## Miniter’s core quotes: coalition vs consensus party - On the structural difference: “The left is a **coalition party** in all countries where there is a left… you end up with this enormous coalition.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3943)] “Republican Party… the media always reports fights within the Republican Party as, ‘Oh my gosh, the whole thing is going to fall apart,’ because they assume it’s a coalition party. **It is not. It is a consensus party.**”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3985)] - On what a coalition party looks like: “That’s why they talk about **intersectionality**… but in reality, what does the steel worker who’s a proud member of his union have in common with the vegan women’s‑studies professor and the fitness nut who is living off the grid somewhere… you end up with this enormous coalition.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3922)] Leaders of such a party “need a skill like Bill Clinton had… the ability to **synthesize, to make compromises, to hold the different parts that don’t naturally cohere together**. Nancy Pelosi was absolutely brilliant at this.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=3950)] - On what a consensus party looks like: “In a **consensus** party, people fight until about **80% of them share a view and then the other 20% either go along or change their minds**… fights among factions are actually very healthy because that’s what moves the consensus around inside the party.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4015)] He says we know this model is working for Republicans because they are “drawing in new people” (notably more Hispanics and some black and Asian voters) rather than bleeding them.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4020)] - On the danger for a coalition party: When the left starts “taking out leaders and having **purity tests**, that’s **death to a coalition party**.”[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4158)] He adds that Democrats are increasingly trapped in managing internal coalition pieces (unions, campus activists, etc.) instead of prioritizing outcomes for voters.[[youtube](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-hj5uwclmk&t=4227)] These are the main lines you’ll want for your notes on coalition vs consensus party structure. --- ## Who else works with similar ideas? Several writers and theorists talk about similar dynamics, even if they use different vocabulary: - **Seymour Martin Lipset & Stein Rokkan** – Their classic work on “cleavage structures” and party systems in Western Europe describes mass parties on the left as aggregating multiple social cleavages (class, religion, center–periphery), making them inherently coalition‑like, while some right‑of‑center parties function more as defender‑of‑the‑nation consensus blocs.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Angelo Panebianco** – In _Political Parties_, he distinguishes between mass‑integration parties with broad coalitions and more cadre/elite parties that operate by internal bargaining and emerging consensus among core actors.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Daniel Ziblatt & Steven Levitsky** – In _How Democracies Die_, they discuss parties as gatekeeping coalitions and show how big‑tent, multi‑group parties on the left often struggle to police extremes, while conservative parties frequently work through internal bargaining to maintain a shared line—close to Miniter’s “purity tests kill coalition parties” point.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] - **Michael Lind** – In _The New Class War_, Lind effectively treats center‑left parties as alliance structures stitching together public‑sector unions, NGOs, and cultural elites, versus more internally contested but voter‑responsive center‑right parties.[[pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3170732/)] These give you good anchors if you want to cross‑reference Miniter’s coalition/consensus distinction with more formal party‑systems literature. ---